GIBBS AND OTHERS vs. GRAY AND OTHERS.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONSe

In the Court of Erchequer.-EasterTerm.
GIBBS AND OTHERS VS. GRAY AND OTHERS-GRAY AND OTHERS VS. GIBBS
AND OTHERS.
A merchant loaded a Spanish vessel at C., chartered to deliver the cargo in
London. The vessel put into an intermediate port disabled; whereupon the
captain, without any communication with the merchant or his agents at that port,
though aware of their existence, entered into a charter party with the captain of
another vessel to take the cargo to its destination, which the charter party described to be 470 tons, the captain of the disabled vessel agreeing to load the other
and pay freight at a rate per ton exceeding the rate of freight for which the first
vessel was chartered. The vessel was loaded, and a bill of lading in accordance
with the terms of the charter party was signed by the captain of the second
vessel. On the arrival of the cargo at its destination it was discovered to be only
844 tons, and the merchant offered to pay freight on that amount at the rate
agreed on by the charter party, which having been refused, he paid for 470 tons
under protest, and brought an action for money had and received to recover the
difference :-Held,
1. First, that the merchant was entitled to recover.
2. Secondly, that the master had no authority to bind the merchant to pay the
freight mentioned in the bill of lading.
3. Thirdly, that the merchant was not liable in an action upon the charter party
for the neglect to provide a full cargo.
4. Fourtlbly, that the representation in the charter party that the cargo amounted
to 470 tons did not amount to a warranty.
5. Fifthly, supposing that representation had been a false and fraudulent one,
the merchant would not be accountable for it.

This was a special case for the opinion of the court, which was
argued on a previous day in this term by Cleasby and Tomlinson
for the respective parties.
. The questions involved fully appear in the judgment of'the court.
It will therefore be sufficient to add that the following authorities
were referred to :-Shiton vs. Thornton, 9 Ad. & El. 414; The
Gratitudine,3 Rob. Adm. 240; Longridge vs. Dorville, 5 B. & Al.
117 ; _freeman vs. The East India Cornyany, ibid, 617 ; Cross vs.
L'glinz, 5 B. & Ad. 106; Brigs vs. The Merchant Traders'Association, 13 Q. B. 167; Arthur vs. Barton, 6 M. &W. 138 ; Gornfoot
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vs. Fowke, ibid, 858; Duncan vs. Benson, 1 Exch. 587; TJindle
vs. Barker, 25. L. J., Q. B. 849; Abb. Ship. 867, 8th ed.; and
Story on Agency, 69.-Cur. adv. vult.
The judgment of the court was now, delivered by--.
POLLOCK) C. B.-This was a special case for the opinion of the
court. The pleadings were set out at length, but it is not necessary
to state them wi.th particularity, as it was agreed by the learned
counsel that the real question arose upon the count for money had
and received, and the question as to the right of the plaintiffs to
nominal damages on the other count was not discussed.
The facts stated were, that in December, 1854, the plaintiffs.
loaded on board a Spanish vessel called the Oriente, at the Chincha
Islands, a cargo of guano, which had been chartered by them, and
for which the captain signed bills of lading, the guano being
deliverable in London. In January, 1855, the Oriente put into Valparaiso, in a disabled state, and the cargo was .discharged into a
hulk, and it became necessary to tranship and forward, the cargo
by another vessel. On the.26th March the captain of the Oriente.
entered into a charter party with the captain of a vessel called the
Fairy Queen, of which the defendants were owners. The charter
party, purported to be between the master of the Fairy Queen, of
the burthen of 818 tons register, or thereabouts, of the one part,
and the master of the Oriente, "for account and risk of the owners
of the cargo of said vessel, or whomsoever it may concern," of the
other part; and stipulated that the Fairy Queen should proceed
alongside the hulk, and take on board therefrom "the cargo put on
board thereof, and forming the cargo brought by the Oriente, being
470 tons of guano,.more or less, not exceeding, &c., and therewith
proceed to Cork for orders to proceed to any port in the United
Kingdom, and there deliver her cargo;" and the Captain of the
Oriente, as. agent as aforesaid, agreed to load the vessel, and pay
freight at the rate of 51. 2s. 6d. per ton ; and it was agreed that the
captain of the Fairy Queen should sign the bill of lading, with a
clause of "weight and quality unknown," without reference to the.
rate.of freight, and without pr'ejudice to the charter party. The
guano in the hulk was loaded on board the Fairy Queen, and what.

740

GIBBS AND OTHERS vs.. GRAY AND OTHERS.

further took place at Yalparaiso appeared from the evidence of a
Mr. Fox, the agent of the Fairy Queen at that place, and her captain. Mr. Fox stated the fact of the arrival of the Oriente; that
her cargo was loaded on board the hulk, and that she was condemned,
and that afterwards the charter party of the Fairy Queen was made;
that before the charter party was made several discussions took
place between the captains of the Oriente and th4 Fairy Queen as
to the quantity of guano brought by the Oriente; that the captain of
the Fairy Queen expressed fear that that quantity was not a full
cargo for the Fairy Queen; that the captain of the Oriente said
there was fully 470 to 500 tons, and more above than below that
quantity, and wished to insist on the Fairy Queen taking 500 tons,
which the captain of the Fairy Quecn refused to consent to take;
and that the Fairy Queen was preferred by ihe captain of the
Oriente to a small vessel called the Annie Saunderson, on account
of her greater size and capacity; that after the charter party was
made, and the guano put on board the Fairy Queen, the captain of
the latter vessel insisted that he had not taken more than 350 tons
on board; thai the captain of the Oiente insisted that he had more,
and that ultimately both parties went to the office of the Spanhish
Consul, where it was agreed that freight should'be paid on the full
quantity of guano mentioned in the charter party, and, in order to
carry out this agreement, a bill of lading was signed by the captain
of the Fairy Queen, dated the 27th April, 1855. The bill of lading
stated the loading of the guano on board in the usual way, to be
edelivercd to Murieta & Co., or their assignees, he or they paying
-freight for the said guano as 470 tons, as per charter party. Murieta
& Co. are the agents for. the general average settlement of the
Oriente, and their name -was suggested by Mr. Fox for the benefit
-of the captain of the Fairy Queen. The captain of the Fairy Queen
was willing to fill up the ship with other cargo, but none could be
*obtained, and the captain of the Oriente urged his immediate sailing.
Upon the cross-examination of Mr. Fox it was proved that the
plaintiffs had, to the knowledge of the captain of the Oriente and
the witness, agents at Valparaiso, and that there was a house of
.Messrs. Gibbs & Co. there, and that no reference was made to them;
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that the Oriente, being repaired, sailed from Valparaiso with a
cargo, and that the loading of the Fairy Queen was finished at the
least three or four days before the bill of lading was signed, and that
the agreement introduced in it was made after the loading was
complete. On his re-examination he stated that the current rate of
freight from Valparaiso to England, at the time of the making of
the charter part, was from 5Z. to 5Z. 5s. The captain of the Fairy
Queen, wa's also examineol, and the substance of his evidence NWs, that
after he had taken on board all the guano supplied to him from the
hulk, he insisted that he had not more than 350 tons on board, and
wanted 180 tons more; that the captain of -the Oriente insisted he
had 470 tons, and that then the agreement was made that he should
be paid freight as for 470 tons, and that on this understanding
he signed the bill of lading. He- further stated that he was
willing to load other cargo, and that on the" 29th April he
received a letter from the captain of the Oriente, urging him to
sail at the earliest possible opportunity; that he did so, and arrived
in London, on t)ie 4th of August following, having called at Cork
for orders. The case then proceeded to state that the plaintiffs
procured the bill Qf lading of th&guano to be endorsed to them by
Messrs. Mlurieta. The cargo loaded and delivered was 344 tons
only. - The plaintiffs offered io pay'freight upon this 314 tons at
the rate of 51. 2s. 6d. per ton, being the rate fixed upon by the
charter party. The defendants insisted upon beiiig paid at that
rate uppn 470 tons, the quantity which might have been loaded on
board, and what- they alleged was payable according to the subsfttuted agreement and the bill of lading. The result was a correspondence of some length,; &nd ultimately, by arrangement, the
plaintiffs paid, under protest, a sum of 2,3881. 13s. 9d., being the
freight of 5. 2s. 6d. upon 470 tons, and exceeding 6451. 15s. the
freight payable on the actual quantity delivered at the same rate.
The questions stated for the opinion of the court in the first of'
these actions, Gibbs and others vs. Gray an'Z others, are whetherthe plaintiffs are entitled to recover back the sum of 6451. I5s., and
also nominal damages in respect of the detention of the cargo. The
first question only has been argued before us, the other being in
reality a mere question of the costs of the pleadings.
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In the argument -all the authorities existing, or indeed, as we
believe, bearing at all upon the question, were cited.
The well-known case of the Gratitudine,3 Rob. Adm. 240, and
.that of -Duncanvs. Benson, 1 Exch. 537, were fully referred to ;
but it was argued by both the learned counsel that there was very
little existing authority in English law upon the subject, and that
the case of Shipton vs. Thornton, 9 Ad. & El. 314, and a section
in Ablb. Ship. 367, 8th ed., are the most material, and the most
directly bearing upon it. The question is of great difficulty, and
has led to much difference of opinion amongst the most eminent
foreign writers on jurisprudence; but it is more especially so in the
law of England, which regards with extreme jealousy the permitting
any man to be bound by contract or act of another, except direct
and express authority be given to him.
In the present and similar cases a merchant has loaded on board
a ship a cargo, upon a contract that it is to be conveyed in that ship
from the port of loading to the port of discharge, and a provision is
contained in the contract that the shipowner is to be excused from
so doing if prevented by certain perils mentioned it it. A master
is placed in command of the ship, over whose appointment the merchant has no influence or control. One of the perils occurs in the
course of the voyage, which, accordiig to the contract, excuses the
shipowner from conveying the cargo further; but the master, instead of acting upon it, determines to forward the cargo by another
ship, of which the merchant knows nothing, and in regard to which
he has no opportunity of exercising any selection or choice. The
question is, what contract, if any, the master can make obligatory
upon the merchant in regard to the conveyance by the substituted
ship.
When the merchant has an agent or a house of business, to the
knowledge of the master, at the intermediate port where the ship
has put into in distress, can he, without communication with them,
or giving them the option of receiving the cargo there, put it on
board another ship, and forward it to the port of discharge?
We are not aware of any authority in the English law in which
the master is said to have such power.
In Shipton vs. Ttornton, Lord Denman, in delivering the judg-
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ment of the court, only put the case "where the shipowner or
master has no opportunity of consulting the freighter;" and in the
section of Abbott on Shipping before referred to, the learned author
says, "the merchant should be .consulted if possible."
In the
present case the plaintiffs had an agent at Valparaiso, and indeed
it would seem that a branch of the house carrying on business in
the same name was established there; and it is stated in the case,
that although all the parties knew this, no reference or communication whatever was made them.
Again: has the master authority to contract that the merchant
shall pay a rate of freight higher than that originally stipulated?
In the present case the rate of freight by the Oriente is not stated,
but we have no doubt that the rate of freight demanded and paid
under protest, which was nearly 71. per ton, was considerably higher
than the original rate of freight by the Oriente.
Again: has the master authority to bind the merchant to a charter
party, contracting not merely for the conveyance of the cargo, but
for dead freight, or is his authority confined to loading the goods
on board the substituted ship under the ordinary contract by a bill
of lading?
Many other difficulties will readily suggest themselves to any one
who has considered the subject ; but upon the question in the present
case we are all of opinion that the master of the Oriente had not
authority to bind the plaintiffs to pay the freight mentioned in the
bill of lading. He had made a charter party at the rate of 51. 28.
6d. per ton for freight, containing a stipulation as to the loading of
a full cargo. All the guano was put on board, and no more was
forthcoming. The consequence was, that a right in the nature of a
chose in action had arisen against the person who was bound by the
charter. On this state of things we are of opinion that the master
had not authority to substitute or create against the plaintiffs
(assuming them to be liable on the charter) a lien upon the cargo in
respect of this chose in action, or, in other words, to create a lien
for dead freight; and we think that the plaintiffs are not then to
be liable for any thing beyond the freight mentioned in the charter
party, which was the current rate of freight at the time at Valparaiso, and are therefore entitled to recover back the further sum
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which they were compelled to pay under the circumstances mentioned in the case.
The case of Gray and others vs. Gibbs and others, is a cross
action, and the special case upon the same facts states the question
for the opinion of the court to be, whether the defendants in this
action are liable on the charter party of the Fairy Queen for the
neglect to provide a full cargo. We are very strongly inclined to
be of opinion that the master of a ship has not authority, under
such circumstances as the present, to charter a ship, and bind the
merchant to provide a full cargo, or, in other words, for the payment of dead freight. If he has such authority, what is the limit to
it ? Can he, when the goods of the merchant are only sufficient to
fill the ship to the extent of one-half or three-fourths of its capacity,
enter into a contract obligatory upon the merchant to pay for the
unoccupied space ? It may be that the master of a disabled ship
has power to send forward the cargo to the port of discharge by
another shipy and upon that taking place, which would be a performance of the contract, if the original ship had arrived in safety,
the master or owner may be entitled to the freight originally contracted for, the conveyance of the cargo by, and the right and true
-delivery from, the substituted ship being deemed a substantial
performance of the voyage, and equivalent to the conveyance by,
and right and true delivery from, the original ship. But we think
in this case that all which by the charter party was contracted to
be loaded was the cargo of the Oriente. The words of the charter
party are :-The cargo put on board the hulk, forming the cargo
brought to Valparaiso by the Oriente, being 470 tons of guano,
more or less." It is clear from the charter party itself, and proved
beyond all doubt by the evidence, that the cargo was represented to
be 470 tons at the least, but we do not think there is a warranty to
this effect. If there be no warranty, the only liability which could
exist would be for a false and fraudulent representation. This is
not alleged to have been the case,'for the statement of the captain
of the Oriente is admitted to have been an honest one ; but if it were
not, the defendants, Messrs. Gibbs, would not be responsible for it.
There is no authority or principle for holding that the owners of a
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cargo are, under such circumstances, liable for a false and fraudulent representation by the master.
The result, therefore, is, that the verdict is to be entered for the
plaintiffs in the first action for 6451. 158., with interest from the
18th August, 1855, on the issue on the first count, and that as to
the other issues the jury be discharged; and, as to the second
action, that the judgment be for the defendants.

In the Court of Exchequer, April, 1857.
DYNEN VS. LEACH.'

1; Where an injury happens to a servant while in the actual use of an instrument,
engine or machine, in the course of his employment, of the nature of which he is
as much aware as his master, and the use of which is, therefore, the proximate
cause of the injury, he cannot, at all events if the evidence is consistent with his
own negligence in the use of it being the real cause, nor in case of his dying from
the injury can his representative, under Lord Campbell's act 9 & 10 Vict..c. 98,
recover against his master, there being no evidence that the injury arose through
the personal negligence of the master. Nor -is it any evidence of such personal
negligence of the master that he has in use in his works an engine or machine
less qafe than some other which is in general use.
2. Therefore, where a laborer was killed through the fall of a weight which he was
raising by means of an engine to which he attached it by fastening on to it a
clip, and the clip had slipped off it, it was held that there was no case to go to
the jury in an action by his representative against the master, although it appeared
that another and safer mode of raising the weights was usual, and had been discarded by the orders of the defendant.

This was an action, brought in the Passage Court of Liverpooi,
by an administratrix, under Lord. Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c.
93,2 'which provides for compensation to the families of persons killed
by accident.
The declaration stated that the intestate was a servant of the

126 Law Jur. 221 Ex.
2 A Similar act has been passed in many of the States of the Union.
Tidd's Prac., 9. 8d Am. Ed. notes.
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defendant, employed by him in his business as a sugar-refiner, on
the terms that the defendant would take due and ordinary care that
the intestate should be exposed to no extraordinary risk in the course
of his said service; but that the defendant wrongfully exposed him
to extraordinary risk in the said employ, so that, through the carelessness of the defendant, a sugar-mould fell upon the intestate while
he was engaged in the said service and caused his death.
Pleas~-First, not guilty; second, a denial that the intestate was
employed on the terms stated.
At the trial, the plaintiff's counsel stated the case thus :-That
the defendant was a sugar-refiner, and had employed the intestate
as a laborer; that it was part of the intestate's duty to fill the sugarmoulds and hoist them up to higher floors in the warehouse by means
of machinery; that the usual mode of attaching the moulds to the
machine was by placing them in a sort of net-bag, and which effectually prevented any accident; that this was the mode adopted by the
defendant until, from motives of economy, he substituted a kind of
celin, which laid hold.of the rim of the mould; that the deceased, on
the occasion in question, had himself filled the mould, and fastened
it to the clip, but that, when it was being raised, the clip, by some
jerk, slipped off the mould, which fell on his head and killed him.
The learned judge on this statement, nonsuited the plaintiff, but gave
him leave to move to set the nonsuit aside.'
C. Blackburn, now moved according to the leave reserved.
MARTIN, B.-Does not the case come within the principle of
Priestleyl vs. Fowler," and the class of cases decided upon it'?
POLLOCK, 0. B.-These cases show that the deceased could not
have recovered against his master for an injury caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant 4 ; can his representative, then, recover for
a death caused by his own negligence? He himself fixed the clip.
And stated and signed a case for the purpose, of which the above is the substance.
2 a Mee. & W. 1; s. c. 7 Law J. Rep. x. s, Exch. 42.
3 Vide Wigmore vs. Jay, 19 La W . Rep. x. s. Exch. 300.
4 And the representative cannot recover for the death in a case in which the

deceased could not have recovered for an injury, vide sziyra, et ride lutchins.n v4.

the York, Nercastle and Berwick Railway Company, 19 Law J. Rep. x. s Exch. 2!4.
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The negligence imputed is not in the way of fixng the' clip, or in
the manner of using it, but in the use of it at all. It is not the
usual mode, and not a proper mode of raising the mould.
BRAMWELL, B.-As to its not being usual, that is immaterial.
It was unsafe.
POLLOCK, 0. B.-Then the deceased should not have used it.
There is a recent case in the House of Lords which seems to show
that it was the duty of the masfer not to have adopted such a mode
-Patterson vs. Wallace.' There, in an appeal on a Scotch case,
the Lord Chancellor, in giving judgment, said that the law in England
and Scotland on the subject was the same; and that when a nfaster
employed his servant in a work which was dangerous, he was bound
to take all reasonable precautions for the safety of his workman.
POLLOCK, C; B.-That was an oeiter dictum as regards the law
of England; the appeal being from Scotland.
No doubt, it is no direct decision on the question, but is a Weighty
expression of opinion.
'POLLOCK, C. B.-But it must be taken -withreference to the facts.
The master was a miner; the workman had pointed out that a,
stone overhanging the works wa dangerous and likely to fall, and
it did fall-soon after and killed him. The House of Lords held,
1 AM'Qunen's Reports of Scotch cases in, the House of Lords. 748. "ee also
Brydon vs. Stewart, 2 .bid. 80, in which the Solicitor General (for the defendant,
the master,) citing the former case, says "the law of both countries on questions
of this sort is the same, except that in Scotland it would appear that a master is
responsible for injuries done by a fellow workman; and the Lord Chancellor in giving
judgment said, ' a master by the laws of both countries is liable for accidents occasioned by his neglect towards those whdm he employs.'" There the action was by
the representatives of a miner who had been killed by the fall of a stone upon him
while he was being drawn up through the shaft of the mine, "the istone falling by
reason of the shaft being in an unsafe state from causes for which the master, the
defendant, was responsible." That was the form of the issue on which the jury
found for the complainant. See as to the difference between the la* of England
in such cases as regards master and servant, Seymour vs. Madox, 20 Law 3. Rep.
,. s.Q. B. 827, Hutchinson vs. the York, Rewcastle and Berwick Railway Company,
19 Law J. Rep. x. s. Exch. 296; and as xegards strangers, Reedie vs. the London
and North-Western Railway Company, 4 Exch. Rep. 244, Barnes vs. Ward, 9 Com.
B. Rep. 392; s. c.19 Law J.Rep. x. s.C. P. 115.
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that, by the law of Scotland, there was a case to go to the jury
there was in the present case.
BRAMWELL, B.-The case is clearly distinguishable.
In circumstances, but not in principle.

So

BRAMWELL, B.-There the workman had no connection or concern with the cause of accident, whereas here he was in the actual
use of it.
No doubt; but it was not his fault that it was perilous.
POLLOCK, 0. B.-There was no contract, and there was no general
duty thrown by law upon the master to the effect stated in the
declaration. If the work is more than ordinarily dangerous, the
servant should know it and decline to continue in it.
There is no legal presumption that an unskilled laborer should
know the nature of machinery emploFed.
POLLOcK, C. B.-Every workman is bound to know the nature
of the instrument he uses. Even a hammer or a ladder may be
dangerous.
It was surely for the jury whether the particular mode of raisihg
the mould was unsafe, and whether the deceased could know it ?
PoLLoCK, 0. B.-No; there was nothing for the jury. As to
the method being usual, there was no evidence, except that a safer
method had been used; but a master is not bound to use the safest
method. A pair of steps is safer than a ladder, but business could
not go on if ladders were discarded. And as to'the man's knowledge,
he was bound to know what he actually did; he himself fastened
the clip, and it would be impossible for the jury to tell whether it
was his careless mode of doing it which caused the accident.
It would be for the jury on the whole whether the method was
reasonable and proper.
POLLOCK, C. B.-No; if the man did not think it so, he should
have left. A"servant cannot continue to use a machine be knows
to be dangerous, at the risk of his employer.
He might not know it, andi his means of knowledge would be a
question for the jury.
POLLOCK, C. B.-No ;.it is a question of law.
BRAMWELL, B.-There was no evidence that the method was
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improper; that it was less safe than another did not make it improper'
to be use&
oroLLcx, C. B.-The deceased not only contributed to the accident which caused his death, but did the act which directly caused
it. It is impossible to Speculate as to the-cause, bat it is consistent
with the evidence that it was his own carelessness in fastening the
9 lip. 'At all events, his own act was the proximate cause of the
occurrence, and it is impossib.e to hold thlat to be a ground of action..
BRmwEraT, B.-Therp is nothing legally wrongful in the use b .
an employer of works or machinery more or less dangerous to his
workmen, or less safe than others that naight be adopted. It may
be inhuman so to carry on his works as to expose his workmen to
peril of their, lives, but it does not create &right of action for an
injury which it may occasion when, as in this case, the workman
has known all the facts and is as well acquainted "s the masterwith
the nature of the machinery and voluntarpLy uses it. That was not
so in the case cited from the House -of.Lords, in which the workman
had nothing fo do with the stone the fall of which was theproxima e
causb of the occurrence.' Here on the contrary, the workmauizs
own act was .the proximate cause. Whether- therefore, on -the
principle that the party contributed to or wa the.proximate cause
of the injury, or upon the principle that a seivant cannot sustain
an action against a master for the mere negligence of a servantthis
action cannot be sustained.
CHANIMLL, B.-If I were to speculate on the canse of the accident, I shoud be disposed to think that it was the careless fixing
of the clip by the defendant himself. But we cannot speculate bn
that point; and.tret~ ay judgihent onthe ground iaa the deceased.
himself continued in the employ of the defendant and in the use of
the clip with full knowledge of all the circumstances, so that he
directly contributed to the accident.
L As to th dfece were tie pIalntiff has employed the defendant to do work
&c. see Dakla s. Brown, g on B. Rep. 92 a. e. IS Law J. Rtep. x. sC. P. 44;
as to the personal,neggence reputec to sustaii such aaaction by a servant against
his master, see theludgmentim the recent case, Scott v. the Mayor of Manchester,
idaeparticularl, ,p. 184.
26 Law Jour. Rep. p. 13
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In tie Ezcheguer Chamber, May, 1857.
ROBERTS VS. SMITH AND ANOTHER.

1

The defendant, a master builder, being engaged to repair a house, employed one of

his workmen, A., to erect the scaffolding for that purpose. A. knew how to
build scaffoldings. The materials which were supplied to him by the defendant were in bad condition. The workman broke several of the putlogs, (the
;

pieces of wo6d between the wall and the upright poles), but was ordered by the
defendant not to break any more, as they would do very ell. The scaffolding
having been erected by A. of the materials which were furnished to him, an
accident happened to another workman, B., in consequence of the bad condition
of the putlogs :-Held, in an action by B. to recover compensation for the injuries

received, that there was evidence to go to the jury in support of the plaintiff's
case, and that such evidence ought to have been left to the jury.

This case came before the court by way of appeal from the Court
of Exchequer. The declaration stated, that before and until and
at the respective times of the plaintiff entering into the service of
the defendants, and the committing of the grievances hereinafter
mentioned, the .defendants carried on the business of carpenters and
builders; and thereupon the plainiff, being a bricklayer, entered
and was received, and until the time of the said grievances remained
and continued in the service and employ'of the defendants, in the
way of their said trade, upon the terms and conditions, amongst
others, that the defendants should take and use all due, reasonable,
and proper means and precautions in order to prevent accident,
damage, or injury, or unreasonable and unnecessary risk or danger
from happening or occurring to the plaintiff in the performance of
his duty as such servant of the defendants; and although the plaintiff did all things, and all things -concurred and happened, which
were necessary to entitle him to have the said terms and conditions
performed by the defendants, yet the defendants did not take or
use such due or reasonable or proper means or precautions as aforesaid, but altogether omitted so to do; and by reason thereof, and of
the default and neglect of duty of the defendants in that beha]f the
Appeal from the Court of Exchequer.

21 Jur. 469.
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plaintiff was directed'ana employed by the defendants, assuch thei,servant 'as aforesaid, to perform certain work upon the wall of a
house, and for that purpose to be and remain at a great height from
the ground, upon a certain scaffold affixed to such house; and which
scaffold, for want of the use of such means and precautions as aforesaid, and by'reason of the negligence and default of the defendants
in that behalf then was and remained constructed very unsafely
and insecurely, and in such a defective, rotten, and improper state
and condition as to render it dangerous to be and remanupon the
same for the purpose of doing the said work -which the defendants
then well knew, but whereof the pIaintiff'Was wholly ignorant; ancl
in consequence thereof, whilst the plaintifE was so engaged as aforesaid, a parut of the said scafibd broke and gave way, and the tPlitiff was precipitated and fell- fo the ground with grent violeife.
[Then followed a description of the injury.] The defendants pleadecl
-rst, not guilty; secondly, that the plaintiff was,.not employedOn
the terms and conditions andinmanneri n that behalfin the declaration alleged. At the trilwch tock-pIace before the Lord:Ohif
Baron at Westminster on tihe 29th November, 185G, the fo"14
-evidence was given on behalf of 'the plaintiff The plaintiff proved
that he was. engaged Jy one White to go into the employ of the.
defendants; that he was sent to the house, and that while he was
upon the scafdid doing is work the scaffold broke; he fell to the
ground and broke his thigh: that the ptlobroke. In cross-examlnation he sinted-1" Wite engaged me. My attention was not
directed to the state of the pAtog; it was under the hoard upol.
which I was standing. The man. who Imut the scaflild knew well
how to do it. The putlag rested on the window-sill.' JohuNeegan was examined, and sore---!Iam a laborer. I was employed
to get the scafoding out of Mr. Smith's yard to erect the same.
it is usual to examine the poles, &c. I examined the materials; I
found them k bad conditin, ligt, and worm-eaten. I broke
several that were roten and worm-eaten. William Smith came
afterwards; he asked me who broke the putlogs. I told him I did.
"'ethen tolc me I had no business to do so, and said, ' They will
do very well, as there was no bricks or inortar going on.' He said,
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'Don't break any more.' I put aside such as I thought sound. I
was not there when the accident happened. I used three putlogs
where one would have done. I have been a laborer and scaffolder
for twenty-five years. A sound putlog ought to bear from 15 cwt.
to I ton, or twenty men. The putlogs appeared as if they had got
the rot." Other evidence was given to the same effect. At the
conclusion of the plaintiff's case it was objected that there was no
evidence to go to the jury; and on that ground the Lord Chief
Baron directed a nonsuit, with liberty to the plaintiff to move for a
new trial if there was evidence to go to the jury. A rule was afterwards obtained by the plaintiff, calling upon the defendants to show
cause why the nonsuit entered on the trial, and the judgment signed
thereon, if any, should not be set aside, and a new trial had, on the
grounds that there was evidence for the jury in behalf of the plaintiff's case, and that the evidence ought to have been left to the jury
for them to decide upon it. It was agreed between the plaintiff's
and the defendants' counsel, in order that the plaintiff might appeal,
that the rule should. be discharged by the Court of Exchequer; and
it was against this ruling by such arrangement that this appeal was
brought.
Temple, (. Wray Lewis with him), for the plaintiff.-There
was evidence here to show negligence on. the part of the defendants
themselves, and the Chief Baron was wrong in not leaving that
evidence to the jury. The accident was caused by the breaking of
the putlogs. There was evidence to go to the jury upon which the
plaintiff would be entitled to a verdict; but if there was any evidence,
that would be sufficient. It is not intended to dispute the correctness of the decisions in Hutcheson vs. Yorke, 19 L. J., Ex., 296,
and Priestley vs. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, for those cases are not
conclusive upon the point raised in the present case. Patersonvs.
Wallace, 1 Macq. 748, is in point. In that case an action was
brought upon the ground that the deceased had lost his life by reason
of the masters' negligence, through their agents-having carelessly
left a very large stone Ulon the roof of a mine in so dangerous a
position that it fell upon the workman, when engaged in digging
out the coal, and killed him upon the spot. Evidence was given to
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show that the -deceased and the other men employed in the mine
had pointed out to the unlerground manager of the mine that the
roof was in a very dangerous position; that he made some answer
intimating that there was no danger, lu that he afterwards sent
some persons down to remove the stone. Before this was done,
howeve?, it fell, and killed the deceased. The Lord Chancellor
Lord Cranworth said, "Now, in order to recover damages, the
family must establish two propositi6fis : first of al, they must show
that the stone was in a dangerous position, owing to the negligence
bf the masters; and nex4 that the workman whose life was forfeited,
lost it by reason of that negligence, and not by reasopi of rashness
on his own part." And again.- " It was not for the court below,
nor is it for your Tirdahips , to say what would-have been the conclusion.at which the jury would have arrived, r ought to har
arrived, upon the eidenm.. The question for the court below and
for the House is this-was there evidence that mightby possibility
justly have led the Juryto come to a, conclusion in favor of the
plaintiffis upo both the propositions to which I have adverted!"
And again-mTh uetion is, whiat ought to have been saidl by the
judge to the jay after fie evidnce had been given? Itwas his
duty to point out to the the evidece which -bore vpon the two
propositions, namely, wfier'there had been &.want of tineaud
remoal, as they cl it, upon te part of the *asers, and whether
they were satisfied that Bateson cam by his death, not by reasm
of bi own rashmes but by reaon of his having so implicifly relied
upon the assurances which were given him by the vnderground
agent.- BRdis vs. &=wart, 2 Maici. Sf). In the iargna note
is--A master is hound to take M reasonable precaudions tD secure
Itis no answer to the aim of damages
iswrwkn
the safety ofM
by the urving relaives; of a workman accdentaly killed in a
mine, whi& was not in a sa&and sufident state, to say that he
wasat that momentof tie in the act of leaving thew rk for a
master is
purpose of Mis own.." Lord Breugha sas, c"
state of hs Uckle, which in the present inf- t
are
stance 'was defeaivq, aud ka&Qccaed this lamentable accident."
Upon the autority d tRae two c es it might be auccessfly con48
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tended that the judgment of the court ought to be in favor of the
appellant, without the evidence of Nellegan, but that witness gave
evidence which was quite conclusive as to negligence on the part of
the masters themselves. It is true that he used the best materials
he could out of the stock of the masters, but the masters would not
allow him to test any more of the putlogs, and were informea of the
bad state in which they were.
Knowles, for the defendants.-The ruling of the Lord Chief
Baron was correct. Where a workman enters into the employ of a
master, the business being of such a description as that he will be"
aware that the master will not be personally employed in the erection
of the building, but that his fellow-workman will be so, and an injury
occurs to him in the course of his employment, the master is not
responsible if he has used due care in choosing his workmen. CocKBURN, C. J.-Not only the workmen, but the materials also. No
doubt he must employ servants who will look at the materials; and
here it appears that Nellegan put aside such as appeared to him to
be sound. The duty of the master does not go so far as is alleged
in the declaration; though he employs an unfit person, he is not
responsible if he has taken due care in choosing him. In Seymour
vs. Maddoceks, 16 Q. B. 326, it was alleged that the defendant had
suffered the floor of his theatre to be insufficiently lighted, and a
hole to be open without sufficient fence, so that the plaintiff, a performer, was injured by falling into the hole; and it was held, that
the duty, a breach of which was laid, did not arise from the particular
facts stated in the declaration, nor from the general relation of
master and servant. WIGHTmAN, J.-If the allegations had been
the same there as in this case there .might have been a different
construction of the matter. Tarrantvs. Webb, 18 C. B. 797, was
a case in which an action was brought to recover damages for an
injury sustained by the plaintiff from the falling of a scaffolding on
which he was working in the employ of the defendant, a house
decorator. JEuvBS, C. J., said-" The rule is now well established
that no action lies against the master for the consequences to a
servant of the mere negligence of his fellow. The master may be
responsible where he is personally guilty of negligence, but certainly

